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LEGACY OF EUROPEAN ENTERPRISE: 
TEACHING BUSINESS HISTORY IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CURRICULUM
Marco Althaus
Abstract
Business history can be a valuable, even critical element 
in teaching international management – not only at elite 
institutions and at postgraduate level, but at universities of 
applied sciences and in undergraduate education, too. It is 
specifically relevant for programs with a focus on Europe. 
Students should be given a chance to discover common 
and connected pasts of European enterprise. The article 
offers a rationale for curriculum integration and discusses 
case selections and teaching methods for non-historians. 
Five exemplary themes are presented: East India compa-
nies, financial market bubbles, telegraphy, the Suez Canal, 
and the emergence of airlines. 
Zusammenfassung
Unternehmensgeschichte kann ein wertvoller, sogar kri-
tischer Beitrag in der Vermittlung des internationalen 
Managements sein – nicht nur an elitären Einrichtungen 
und im Master, sondern auch an Fachhochschulen und 
in Bachelor-Studiengängen. Besonders relevant ist sie für 
Studiengänge mit Fokus Europa. Studenten sollten eine 
Chance erhalten, die gemeinsame und zusammenhängen-
de Vergangenheit europäischer Unternehmenstätigkeit 
zu entdecken. Der Artikel begründet die Integration ins 
Curriculum und diskutiert Fallauswahl und Lehrmethodik 
für Nichthistoriker. Eine exemplarische Auswahl von fünf 
Themen wird gezeigt: Ostindienkompanien, Finanzmarkt-
Blasen, Telegrafie, der Suezkanal und die Entstehung von 
Fluggesellschaften.
INTRODUCTION
In fall 2013, five years after the 2008 
financial panic, media and academic 
events were awash with retrospective: 
How could it happen? Can it happen 
again? What lessons have been learnt? 
The global economy, much less the Eu-
rozone, is not yet back to normal. Even 
though some nations prosper, all con-
tinue to struggle. Economists are still 
searching for their soul; they received 
much blame for modeling the fantasy 
of efficient, well-tuned markets. Uni-
versities, too, were rebuked. They had 
trained the people who ran the casino, 
or trusted, sold and bought its prom-
ises. Business educators have reasons 
for critical self-inspection. Have they 
responded well enough? 
Back then, students were deeply dis-
turbed as anyone when the crisis hit. 
They demanded answers. Professors 
tried to explain; confused themsel-
ves, they tried to reconstruct events 
and put them in perspective. Most of 
those students are on the job market 
by now. A new generation is coming. 
A first-semester student today was 
a fresh-faced teen when Lehman 
Brothers collapsed and when Eurozone 
leaders met to rescue whole nations. 
Chances are she did not pay much 
attention, nor did she understand. For 
her it is already history. Five years is a 
long time in a young person’s life. She 
may or may not ask to discuss the re-
cent past in class. Hopefully, she will. 
But what will professors tell her about 
the lessons of history? And what is 
their goal?
I. FINDING A PLACE FOR HISTORY
Among the post-2008 wake-up calls 
was the plea to engage future decision- 
makers with history so they will not 
create crises just to relearn old less-
ons. It clicked with the new public 
audiences that business and econo-
mic historians found. Pedagogues 
like Mittelstaedt et al. (2013) argue 
that financial crises are “ideal teaching 
moments” due to their “great potential 
to encourage learning from the past and 
to foster socio-economic education” 
and help to “learn learning” (pp. 11, 19).
Yet universities did not make stringent 
efforts to secure history good spots in 
curricula. Understandably, business 
departments find it hard to squeeze 
in socially demanded extras, be they 
history, ethics, corporate citizenship 
or sustainability. Rather, faculties are 
pressed to purge overloaded curricula 
of ballast. Also, most European facul-
ties maintain a core subject concept 
and lack the humanities and social sci-
ence base of U.S. liberal arts colleges. 
A few take pride in a studium generale, 
but they are rare. 
A killer argument is that young peo-
ple do not enroll in business studies 
for antiquarian retro subjects. It is 
assumed that history is for them at 
best charming, at worst boring, but in 
any case wasteful and irrelevant to a 
career. They demand what universities 
advertise: newest management know-
how. Busy with the here and now 
and near future, they come not to be 
enlightened but to acquire skills and 
technical prowess which (they think) 
will impress employers. 
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The attitude is advanced by the Bolo-
gna-induced priority on skills, com-
petences and employability. Keen 
subscribers are institutions of voca-
tional higher education: the degree-
granting polytechnic, university of 
applied sciences, Fachhochschule 
in Germanic countries, Dutch ho-
geschool, Nordic högskola, and the 
like. Business studies are popular and 
growing there. Such schools promise 
to academically teach tools and tech-
niques but use theory in lighter doses. 
That is a unique selling proposition. It 
forms the “applied” brand. Unsurpri-
singly, their management studies inte-
grate only miniature curricula of eco-
nomics; very few offer freestanding 
economics degrees.  Most business 
historians drop anchor at large econo-
mics departments, so the “applied” 
school is no natural home. 
Elite business schools may run a dif-
ferent kind of ship. Their clientele may 
expect a distinguished leadership 
education which offers the idea that 
if you want to make business history, 
you should also read it. It can be a 
cultural identifier, mark of habitus, or 
a copy of top American MBA schools 
where business history has a lobby 
and a tradition. More pedestrian uni-
versities have a less elite profile of stu-
dents who “might not feel the need to 
understand how and why those who 
ruled the business world at some his-
torical points did what they did” (Bu-
cheli, 2012, p. 17). 
There is one field where business edu-
cation even at very down-to-earth 
universities is open to very broad 
interdisciplinary missions: international 
business (IB). Narrow functional-tech-
nical classes do not suffice. Employers 
want staff who can work in (and lead) 
cross-cultural teams, or as expatriates 
in irritatingly different environments. 
IB students are set to avoid traps of 
thinking “what works here works 
anywhere.” They try to make sense of 
varieties in organization, employment 
standards, or finance traditions. They 
are aware of nuances as they practice 
intercultural communication. They 
study Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. 
They work on languages, country and 
regional studies. They learn to deci-
pher foreign institutions, laws, norms, 
geography, whole economic systems. 
Naturally, without a clue of how history 
shaped them, the IB student will be all 
at sea. 
Strangely, history slips into IB pro-
grams by stealth. The camouflage is 
“culture.” IB programs are unthinkable 
without cultural classes, and deep 
down in module descriptions they 
happily sink history. But IB depart-
ments avoid course titles which have 
the word history in it. It is a symptom 
of presentism: culture is alright since it 
is a factor in the present; but history is 
dead past. History finds acceptance as 
an auxiliary to grasp culture, which in 
turn is auxiliary to core management 
classes.
There is a serious issue hidden under 
the camouflage. History is put to clas-
ses on cultural, social, and political 
environments of business. All fine, but 
where is the dedicated history of busi-
ness, companies and management, 
rather than the history of cultures, 
societies, and politics? 
Such history can aid IB students 
attain the “gift of professional maturity” 
which comes to those who know their 
discipline’s history (Bedeian, 2004). 
Modern subjects often confuse stu-
dents with complexity. They may find 
reassurance in the fact that managers 
long ago struggled with fairly the 
same complex problems. Understan-
ding their struggles, their half-baked 
successes or failures can support 
asking better questions. Students can 
learn that to consult history is an extra 
tool in their toolbox. It helps build a 
critical mind vis-à-vis change, conti-
nuity, and practices hyped as “new”. 
It makes aware that business trends 
are outcomes of their own times and 
places. Business history yields judg-
ment skills, transferable and comple-
mentary to many IB subfields. 
This is not to suggest that the bench-
mark is the standalone business histo-
ry course. It would be great if depart-
ments followed the Copenhagen 
Business School, where an IB flagship 
English-taught B.Sc. starts off with a 
mandatory class, “The Company in its 
Historical and International Setting.” 
Realistically, few IB departments will 
copy that. Some pursue electives, stu-
dium generale subjects, or non-credit 
lectures. However, the author would 
propose that business history can be 
part of core IB classes. Granted, one 
has to make room, i.e. scrap other 
valuable topics. But a link-up of histo-
ry with newest content offers creative 
chances and deepens the modern 
knowledge universities wish to confer.
It reflects the author’s experience 
teaching an “International Manage-
ment in Europe” course (five credit 
points, four semester weekly hours), a 
capstone for Wildau’s B.A. in European 
Management (EM). It is an IB degree 
in European clothes, with a long track 
of “European Competences” classes 
on EU institutions, laws and policies, 
culture and languages. The consecutive 
M.A. has more EU modules and a two-
semester track “European Identities” 
in four tongues. The degree is an ap-
plied business alternative to generalist 
European studies at many universities. 
Its mission is, notably, not to train the 
next generation of EU praetorian gu-
ards; it is no boot camp for Captain 
Europe waving a blue gold-starred 
flag. The EM program’s goal is to make 
graduates who are adept in Europe’s 
everyday business affairs. But the 
degree should attract natural Europhiles. 
They should graduate with a distinct 
identity as “European Managers” 
(with a capital M), showing expert 
pride. Per contra, the author’s con-
sistent experience has been that they 
rather do not. 
In fact, many students even refute the 
degree’s claim that its European pro-
file earns them job-marketable IB ex-
pertise. They yearn for “specialization” 
but do not see it in the European as-
pect of IB. Also, the most ambitious 
seek, in growing numbers, internships 
or a semester out not with Erasmus but 
in destinations like Brazil and China. Not 
because those are more exotic than 
1 In Germany, Hochschule Osnabrück (2011) won attention when it opened a B.A. in “Applied Economics.” Seen as a radical departure, the program was presented 
as a “reaction to the financial crisis,” an effort to “educate socially responsible economists” and be “closer to reality” (than traditional research universities). It 
starts with an economic history class and adds behavioral economics and ethics, all compulsory.
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Tallinn, Rotterdam, Porto, Sofia or Li-
merick but promise more dazzling CV 
credentials. “That’s where the music 
plays,” some say. It would be silly to 
criticize their global appetite. The 
author’s university proudly promotes 
its partnerships with non-European 
places. But EM students’ non-identity 
as “European Managers” is a strange 
outcome of the EM curriculum. 
Somehow a piece of identity seems to 
be missing.
EM teaching staff have scratched their 
heads over students’ distance to the 
core EM profile. The scratch point 
transfers to other university programs 
educating for the Single Market. What, 
if not commitment to Europe, sets 
them apart from IB degrees anywhere? 
Identity is a complex matter, even 
more so when talk is of European iden-
tity. That is the subject of a prolific lit-
erature. It is ambiguous, vague, some 
say artificial. Still, formal education has 
socializing effects which may frame a 
European identity as a serious attitude 
“based not on spontaneous affinities 
but on reflection;” admittedly success 
is limited since identity is formed on 
the streets, too (Banús, 2007, S. 58).
The author would stipulate that if his de-
partment has failed at one crucial point, 
it is this: The EM program has no mani-
fest idea for a “European Manager” as 
a persona or self-concept which con-
nects a unique career definition with 
personal identification with Europe. 
The department has also not tackled 
the question if the “European Mana-
ger” view may change with the EU’s 
crisis, which is an identity crisis as 
much as an economic one. Few EM 
students are idealists, enthusiasts, or 
just optimists about Europe. Many lack 
confidence that its economy is a reliable 
engine; they repeat media messages 
that Europe equals stagnation. Like 
most young people, they do not enjoy 
the potboilers of the peace project 
and the “ever closer union” with the 
largest market on earth, the Euro its 
shiny crown. The crisis has exposed, in 
harshly negative ways, the divergence 
of the 28 (EU) or 50 (Europe) nations, 
rather than what Europe holds in com-
mon in experience and legacy. 
One missing piece in the identity puzzle 
may be a lack of explicit effort to repre-
sent European business roots. History, 
not seen as pure chronicle (“one damn 
thing after another”), forges under-
standing self and others. It provides 
a sense of affiliation and continuity 
through a narrative reservoir about 
who we are, where we came from and 
where we are going. Business history 
opens eyes for nuances, dilemmas, 
solutions, and opportunities in enter-
prise. There is no objectivity in it. Any 
saga is social construction. At university 
it should be pluralistic and critical, 
not glorify deeds. Teachers should be 
quick to point out fallacies of Eurocen-
trism in a global economy. But it is no 
vice to teach students that they own 
a rich common and connected Euro-
pean business heritage which is theirs 
to discover and pass on to others. In 
a Shakespearean way, the past is pro-
logue: It sets the stage for the next act. 
Understanding what stage he is on 
does help an actor to find his role.
II.  NOTES ON NARRATIVES AND  
CREATIVE TEACHING 
Business history is the field of histories 
of management and organization, ap-
plied technology, work, consumption, 
social styles, stakeholder relations in 
society, and of course the biographical 
account of enterprises. Despite strong 
national currents in business history, 
IB’s focus should be on the comparati-
ve and transnational. A key ingredient 
is the history of multinational enterpri-
ses (MNE). It would be wrong to only 
look at MNEs in Europe. Using inter-
continental interaction and globaliza-
tion as a prism or lens to look at Eu-
ropean past experience is productive. 
Globalization is a vital and standard 
theme of IB curricula and textbooks, 
discussing competing ideas – for ex-
ample, is globalization a recent force, 
an evolution since the dawn of human 
history, or a pendulum swinging back 
and forth (Peng & Meyer, 2011, p. 17)? 
In a longer view, students can see that 
Europe has driven and profited by glo-
balization, so perhaps they should not 
fear it.  
Business history relies mainly on cases. 
“Applied” disciplines like to foster in-
ductive learning from examples. A 
case is concrete and memorable. Stu-
dents draw lessons more easily. What 
works in general management edu-
cation works in business history. The 
challenge lies in selection when time 
plans allow only for a few hours. What 
period, what region? What industry? 
What message? One may feel pressed 
to build a representative sampler, but 
well-balanced comprehensiveness is 
illusory. A pragmatic approach is to 
test one’s favorites and allow for peda-
gogical trial and error. 
Later the author’s own selections will 
be summarized without referencing all 
details; topic literature cited is in Eng-
lish and introductory. A suggestion for 
broader works is thus in order here: 
Jones’ and Zeitlin’s Oxford Handbook 
of Business History (2010) is an all-
rounder. In it, Kipping and Üsdiken 
(2008) relate business history and 
management science. Good shelf ad-
ditions are Ferguson’s Civilization: The 
West and the Rest (2011) and Ascent of 
Money (2008); The World that Trade 
Created by Pomeranz/Topik (2006), 
McCraw’s Creating Modern Capi-
talism (1998), Cassis’ Big Business: 
the European Experience in the 20th 
Century (1997), Berend’s Economic 
History of 20th Europe (2006), and 
Broadberry’s Cambridge Economic 
History of Modern Europe (2010). Wil-
kins (2008) reviews MNE literature. To 
counter the typical Anglo-American 
view that Europe’s widespread family 
ownership of big business is a flawed 
idea, James’ Family Capitalism (2006) 
is helpful. Recommended journals are 
Business History, Enterprise and Society, 
Business History Review, Itinerario, 
Enterprise and Society, Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte, Entreprises 
et Historie; among online media, The 
Exchange (exchange-bhc.blogspot.
de), Bloomberg‘s Echoes: Dispatches 
from Economic History (bloomberg.
com/view/echoes), and a syllabus 
collection, Guide to Business History 
Courses Worldwide of Harvard’s Busi-
ness History Initiative (hbs.edu/busi-
nesshistory). The European Business 
History Association, Business Histo-
ry Conference, and national groups 
offer insightful papers and many use-
ful links.
History works on narrative, so ideally 
instructors are master storytellers. 
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For once, PowerPoint is a real help for 
visualizing. Lectures can rely strong-
ly on images, films and multimedia 
capsules, from YouTube to museum 
or educational websites. For example, 
Harvard’s (2007) Historical Returns 
site on the South Sea Bubble has a 
decent video. Online cartoon films add 
a touch of fun, like Richard Condie‘s 
John Law and the Mississippi Bubble 
(1978) or Bob Godfrey‘s Great (1975) 
on Britain’s daredevil entrepreneur 
Isambard Kingdom Brunel (the 
author has seen his students singing 
its tune “It Can’t Be Done” on a sub-
way). TV documentaries are sold on 
DVD; so are movie classics. For examp-
le, the author used scenes from A Dis-
patch from Reuters (1940) to dramatize 
high-risk investments in telegraph net-
works and electrifying impacts its use 
had on stock markets. 
Lecturers should not be afraid to use a 
playful approach, even if that means, 
taking cues from museum pedagogy 
and history marketing, to wear wig 
and costume as a “living history” inter-
preter. Students love this (and put their 
in-class photos on social media while 
the lecture is still on). They can be assi-
gned to work with artifacts, company 
documents, statistics, charts, newspa-
pers, ads, posters, cartoons or satire 
sheets. Digitization has made many 
primary sources available online. Sto-
vall (2010) demonstrates experiential 
learning tryouts, e.g. role-playing the 
Hawthorne Studies, planning a histo-
ric megaproject, or working an assem-
bly line with Lego bricks kits. In the 
author’s telegraph unit, T-mail crews 
strung a line across lecture halls, used 
simple telegraph kits, and competed 
with mobile phone text-messaging 
(aha moment: SMS can be beat by a 
170-year-old technology). Classes may 
be blended with web quests, e-discus-
sions, online and PC games.
Museum excursions are natural, but 
not every local craft gallery fits IB. 
Large technical museums may be a 
good choice. They are full of company 
stories. Take Berlin’s: next to its pla-
nes, aviation floors colorfully portray 
airlines’ and airports’ beginnings and 
social sides of air travel. Museums of 
industry, work, post, or firm collections 
(e.g. BMW or Siemens Museums in 
Munich), or seaport museums on ship-
ping and commodities (sugar, coffee, 
cocoa, tea, fruit, grains, cotton, tobac-
co, metals, oil) can be visited for quiz-
sheet treasure hunts, hands-on activi-
ties, or private seminars. Foreign study 
tours are great opportunities if taken 
off standard tourist tracks. Expert city 
walks in financial, commerce or indus-
try quarters can be found with a local 
agency. Educational institutions often 
offer special packages. In London, the 
author’s students learned a semester’s 
worth at the Museum of Brands (mar-
keting), the Bank of England (money), 
and in a seminar on sugar trade in 
the Docklands (sea trade). At the Bri-
tish Library, the curator encouraged 
awed students to flip through original 
300-year-old ship logs and account 
ledgers of the East India Company. 
III.  BIRTH OF THE MULTINATIONAL 
COMPANY
The author’s first selection unfolds 
as theatrical melodrama on screen. 
Drums roll, ocean winds whistle. Full 
with cargo, cannon ready, tall ships 
glide past exotic harbors. “The most 
powerful companies in history,” 
booms a deep voice. “From trading, 
they gathered immense wealth. And 
they waged wars against each other. 
Can you create a company that will 
dominate all others?” 
The colorful trailer for PC trade simula-
tion East India Companies has a fierce 
tone. It fits the firms’ combative tactics 
and nasty social record; they are not 
a convenient legacy for Europe. But 
they “shaped the modern multinati-
onal” as prototypes (Robins, 2006). 
They drove globalization and created 
big-organization careers with cross-
cultural versatility. Their top managers 
were “merchant kings” in an “age of 
heroic commerce” when “companies 
ruled the world” (Bown, 2009, p. 1). 
But as Bowen et al. (2011) point out, 
Europe’s “monsoon traders” had to re-
concile with Asia’s local market powers 
and fine-tune diplomacy. Almost for-
gotten, they were rediscovered in the 
1990s. Their histories “resonate with 
growing contemporary concerns over 
multinational businesses and the rapa-
cious effects of globalization”; so the 
East India company “appears relevant 
again” (Blythe, 2011, p. 185). They 
lived by state power handed to them 
for public purpose, so they are a bit 
similar to today’s state-backed firms 
coming out of emerging markets (Eco-
nomist, 2011, p. 111). 
In the age of mercantilism, Europe 
chartered some 70 companies with 
national trade monopolies. The “spice 
race” started the run for exotic goods, 
then adding saltpeter, indigo, tea, 
porcelain, silk, cotton, sugar, coffee, 
tobacco, opium. Fleets went first to the 
East Indies, then traded in all Asia, Afri-
ca, and the Americas. Their trade out-
posts were called “factories,” which 
over time evolved from purchasing 
agencies to production centers. In 
some lands, they forced colonial rule 
over the locals. In Europe, their im-
ports profoundly changed consumer 
culture, habits and lifestyles. 
Two firms stand out: Verenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie (VOC, 1602-
1798) and the English East India Co. 
(EIC, 1600-1874). The VOC was formed 
when Dutch cities’ rivaling merchant 
chambers united to form a cartel. 
Their board managed, together with 
regional governors, a huge empire. 
“Statistically, the VOC eclipsed all of 
its rivals in the Asian trade,” says the 
Dutch National Archive: In its heyday, 
30,000 people of many colors were 
employed in 50 locations worldwide. 
In 200 years of operation, it sent one 
million Europeans to work in Asia 
trade, more than the combined rest of 
Europe. 4,800 ships filled their cargo 
holds with 2.5 million tons of Asian 
goods (Boven, 2002, p. 14). It is a key 
lesson that for all its might, VOC went 
broke for poor cost control, loose lea-
dership and bad strategy in changing 
markets. Unchecked graft let people 
joke, VOC stood for “Vergaan Onder 
Corruptie,” perished by corruption 
(Reynders, 2002). Rival EIC lived lon-
ger, but its profitable monopoly was 
killed by home industrialists’ rising 
lobby pushing for free trade (Keay, 
1993, p. 451).
The VOC was the world’s first joint-
stock company. Investors pooled risk 
by what the Dutch called “acties,” 
pieces of the action. They formed a 
legal body state-privileged by limited 
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liability. In Micklethwait’s (2005) ac-
count The Company: A Short History 
of a Revolutionary Idea, this made the 
corporation the key unit of modern 
economies. The stock exchange was 
its child, too. The Amsterdam Beurs, 
origin of today’s NYSE-Euronext, ope-
ned to serve VOC shareholders who 
could not sell stocks back to the firm. 
They had to sell on a secondary mar-
ket. Traders then found they could use 
VOC shares as underlying assets for 
contracts: derivatives were born. The 
tricky trade of short-selling came next. 
London copied the Amsterdam model 
but grew faster: More firms traded, 
liquidity rose, and public debt was 
floated. The English utilized the 
securities market more effectively 
(Petram, 2011, p. 184). Had the VOC 
used its own exchange better, it may 
have survived longer; but it relied 
on “old methods of financing for too 
long” (Gaastra, 2003, p. 173).
IV. WHEN MARKETS BLOW BUBBLES 
In Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps 
(2010), evil speculator Gordon Gek-
ko (“greed is good”) has on his wall 
a painting, a Dutch tulip price index 
chart. It rises steeply, then drops to 
naught: the 1637 Tulipmania. “This is 
the greatest bubble story of all time,” he 
tells a young trader. “People got wiped 
out. But who remembers?” Many do 
now, thanks to post-2008 debates. For 
“extraordinary passions it aroused” 
(Dash, 2001) and colossal fortunes 
lost, it has been cited over and over as 
a showcase of extreme mispricing due 
to easy credit and easy rules. It ended 
in crisis and state bailouts. It is a good 
yarn. But: myth-busting historians say 
Tulipmania is “an artifact” (Thompson 
E. , 2006, p. 99) or “based almost so-
lely on propaganda” (Goldgar, 2007, 
p. 6). For some bubbles’ hyped afterlife, 
it may be said “the bubble has itself 
been bubbled” (Hoppit, 2002, p. 141).
Tulipmania was not really an interna-
tional affair. Most later bubbles were, 
so bubblenomics is fair game for an IB 
class. Bubbles are creatures of inter-
national business. Free cross-country 
capital flow aids them. “For the most 
part,” says Kindleberger in his anato-
my of Manias, Panics, and Crashes, 
“financial crises ricochet from one 
country to another.” They “tend to be 
international and either affect a num-
ber of countries at the same time or 
alternatively spread from the centers 
where they originate to other coun-
tries” (2005, p. 124). So it was in 2008, 
the 2000 Dotcom bubble, 1997 Asia 
meltdown, and 1987 Black Monday. 
Farther back, 1929 is popular to ana-
logize to 2008. 
Even more eerie is the familiar look 
of the 1873 panic (“Gründerkrach”). 
Viennas’s bourse crashed first, then 
Berlin, then Italian, Belgian, Dutch, 
Swiss markets. New York went down; 
panic returned to Vienna. It had all begun 
with a collapse of Europe’s construc-
tion boom, fired by young banks len-
ding freely on loose collateral. In ano-
ther arena, high-risk tools spiraled out 
of control: German investors in U.S. 
rail had built “a complex financial py-
ramid rested on a pinhead” (Nelson, 
2008). Nervous over default, finan-
ciers pulled back. Interbank lending 
froze. Assets turned toxic. A credit 
crunch broke industrials, banks shut 
down, and a long depression followed 
in Europe and America. 
1720 was the earliest European bubble 
year. Next to France and Britain, mar-
kets from Hamburg to Amsterdam, Mi-
lan to Lisbon were affected when the 
crisis hit. It began in London with the 
South Sea Company and the Mississippi 
Company in Paris. These firms sold in-
vestors, many foreign, on riches with 
emerging markets. On paper, they 
set to trade and colonize – but never 
did. Both firms involved state debt as-
sets and public banks. Then Europe 
saw hundreds of “bubble companies” 
copying the cash-collecting model. 
The Dutch called them “windhandel” 
firms, selling the wind. It was a carni-
val of opportunistic start-ups without 
a business plan, bizarre foreign ven-
tures and sure swindles. Long-term 
dividend payments were not what 
equity-buyers wanted. Their clever 
idea was “selling them on to greater 
fools. In a very short time, however, 
they were to discover that there were 
no greater fools in the market than 
themselves” (Chancellor, 1999, p. 72).
Students keen on international finance 
may later say in their careers, “this 
time it‘s different!,” as in the title of 
Rogoff’s and Reinhart’s book (2011). 
They may think, “I know when to pull 
out.” To make them wiser, they can 
reconstruct how infamous firms, like 
South Sea or Mississippi, attracted so 
many. Besides fraud and animal spirits, 
swings of judgment about uncertain 
future profits are at work: “In a bubble 
not everyone is irrational,” notes Fer-
guson (2008, p. 122). It is hard to tell 
in a concrete situation if speculation 
is reasoned risk-taking or stupid gam-
bling. Frehen et al. (2013) argue that 
1720 bubbled because money was bet 
on real innovations: a shift from Asia 
to Atlantic trade, creative concepts 
to swap government debt for private 
stocks, and new models of maritime 
insurance. The market was not without 
fundamentals. But still, speculation 
made them matters of “extraordinary 
popular delusions and the madness of 
crowds” (Mackay, 1995). 
V. BUSINESS GOES ONLINE
Today’s students are digital natives, 
glued to their gadgets. They post, 
poke, tweet, skype, blog, stream, up- 
and download constantly. They can-
not conceive of IB careers without ins-
tant global data flow. One electrifying 
insight is that our digital network eco-
nomy got off in the 1840s. Online pio-
neers created the world‘s first Internet 
in the 19th century; theirs was even 
more revolutionary than the Internet 
of the 20th, argues Standage (2009). 
The original e-mail was a t-mail, t as in 
telegraph. It sparked the telecom and 
electric industries and enabled value-
adding information services. One can 
trace a path “from dot-dash to dot.
com” (Wheen, 2010). Student know-
ledge of the industrial age may be 
reconfigured: Around 1900, students 
usually guess the world’s biggest MNE 
was a manufacturing giant. In reality, 
it was a European telegraph firm (Hu-
gill, 1999, p. 32).
An “intimate relationship between the 
telegraph and commerce” developed 
(Wenzlhuemer, 2012, p. 88). This is 
especially true for IB: Where messages 
before telegraphy had traveled days, 
weeks or months, they were now re-
layed in minutes. From efficient ship-
ping and railway logistics to mail-order 
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catalogues, price data to feeding con-
tent to mass media, the wire was indis-
pensable. It was not cheap, but firms 
were willing to pay premium rates. 
Constant updating kept firms compe-
titive, and telegraphy “was like a drug 
to businessmen, who swiftly became 
addicted” (Standage, 2009, p. 166) 
like smartphone-obsessed managers 
today. Bankers and investors by the 
1870s equipped offices with a ticker 
constantly spitting out real-time stock 
quotes, a teleprinter. Its alphanumer-
ical code lives on in “ticker symbols” 
for listed companies still scrolling over 
websites and TV screens. 
Managers used the telegraph to lead 
and scale up ever-larger firms. It offe-
red headquarters direct reach in vast 
territory. It widened the span of con-
trol. Coordinated companies could 
grow into really big business. One 
telegraphy-era tool every business stu-
dents knows is the organization chart. 
First used in railroads, it not only set 
hierarchies but reporting and data 
flow (Rosenthal, 2013). 
Bypassing middlemen, merchants and 
factories now could make online deals 
with distant suppliers or customers: 
“Suddenly the price of goods and the 
speed with which they could be deli-
vered became more important than 
their geographic location” (Standage, 
2009, p. 165). Equity and commodity 
bourses used to be slow-paced. Many 
regional exchanges only served small 
areas. Telegraphy integrated frag-
mented markets, and had centralizing 
effects. Bourses with larger markets 
made better prices – if traders got 
current price information: “It is axio-
matic that a market cannot be larger 
than the area in which communication 
is, effectively, instant,” says Gordon 
(2000, p. 80). Across Europe, agencies 
for time-sensitive news sprang up like 
those of Charles Havas (Paris), Bern-
hard Wolff (Berlin), Guglielmo Stefani 
(Turin) and Paul Julius Reuter, a Ger-
man in London. His firm, Reuters, now 
with 60,000 staff in 100+ countries, 
promotes itself as “the world’s lea-
ding source of intelligent information 
for businesses and professionals.” In 
2007, Reuters Group plc sold for €13 
billion to Thomson Corp., overtaking 
rival Bloomberg (Thompson, 2007). 
International demand for line infra-
structure was huge. That was a chance 
for foreign specialists like the small Ber-
lin equipment workshop, Telegraphen 
Bau-Anstalt von Siemens & Halske. It 
grew fast as a state contractor for net-
work systems, and as a cable maker. 
Public procurement can be tricky. Bla-
med for technical failures, Siemens fell 
out of favor with the Prussian state. Its 
home market destroyed, the firm sur-
vived by opening foreign subsidiaries. 
The czar let Siemens wire Russia from 
Finland to the Crimea. When it then 
finished the 11,000 km Indo-European 
Line to Calcutta in just two years, it 
was a sensation. Siemens secured 
projects in the Americas and Africa. It 
equipped China, Indonesia, and Japan 
before the century ended. It entered 
transatlantic cable business, too. It 
was a high-risk venture to lay “threads 
across the ocean” (Gordon, 2003), but 
by 1900 hundreds of thousands of 
kilometers of submarine cables con-
nected Europe with all continents via 
seabed. Students may compare cur-
rent and historic global cable maps: 
They realize that when using non- 
European websites, they run data 
on a century-old network (just with 
better bandwidth, thanks to optical 
fibre). The telegraph business had 
made the world a smaller place.
VI. MEGAPROJECT: EUROPE AT SUEZ
Energy firm GDF Suez is one of Europe’s 
oldest MNEs. With 220,000 employees 
in 70 countries and as a Euronext CAC40 
blue chip, it ranks 95th on Forbes’ 
Global2000 list of “most powerful” 
firms; among electric utilities, it ranks 
second (DeCarlo, 2013). What is most 
curious is the name. GDF stands for 
the merged-in Gaz de France. But 
Suez? As in, Suez Canal? Yes. The 
firm, born 1859, built the waterway. 
The Compagnie universelle du canal 
maritime de Suez ran it until 1956 
when Egyptian nationalists took it 
away. France and Britain staged a 
military invasion to retrieve the canal, 
but were halted by the UN. In Paris, 
the firm sat as “mere pawn in a wider 
political game” (Bonin, 2010, p. 474). 
Stranded as a canal company with no 
canal, it changed into a bank group. 
But in the 1990s, it morphed into an 
all-European utilities champion, “quite 
a business school case study for a 
Europeanization management model,” 
(Bonin, 2005, p. 25). In a portrait dis-
cussing the firm’s plans, the Financi-
al Times ran a headline, “GDF Suez 
rekindles spirit of Lesseps” (Betts, 
2010). How can a 21st century student 
understand this 21st century headline?
The FT observed, GDF Suez has been 
“steadily returning to its old Suez Canal 
roots” by going “back to its industrial 
origins,” and pursuing grand plans in 
the Middle East (Betts, 2010). Company 
founder Ferdinand de Lesseps had 
lobbied the Ottoman Empire to fulfill 
Napoleon’s dream: part the desert to 
shorten shipping from Asia to Europe 
by 6,000 km. Since opening 1869, the 
bulk of trade between Europe and Asia 
travels through it, i.e. 10-15 percent of 
global seaborne trade goods (Khan-
kishiyeva, 2013). This likely includes 
most students’ pants, shirts, shoes, 
pens and bags, smartphones, laptops, 
the gasoline in their car’s tank, if not 
the (Asian made) car itself. In 2012, 
16,600 ships with 755,000 tons of 
cargo passed, and paid €5 billion tolls 
(SCA, 2014). A fleet of EU warships 
protects this trade lifeline from pirates 
and terrorists south of Suez. 
Lesseps’ project was truly European. 
European management was key to all 
stages – winning legal concessions, 
filling a capital pool, finding contrac-
tors, operating the ten-year moving 
construction site. The firm’s top mana-
gers and engineering crew had many 
passports. The project came to life on 
a common European belief in that it 
could be done. It successfully created 
attention in Europe. It was less good 
at finding pancontinental financing. 
Leading banks were unenthusiastic, so 
the firm went public to recruit middle-
class investors. Its book-building road 
show went to a dozen nations. Secu-
rities sold well in France but flopped 
everywhere else, partly due to British 
sabotage. Britian feared for its suprem-
acy at sea. Ironically, it later became 
the firm’s major shareholder. 
1.5 million Egyptians worked on the 
canal in a decade. Many were corvée 
laborers supplied by the Egyptian state. 
In a long scandal, the company was 
attacked as a slaveholder. Its mana-
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gers tried to defend the firms’ practi-
ces in the European media, and prove 
human conditions. Yet diseases, heat, 
lack of water and care took their toll: 
35,000 workers died (Wilson, 1939, 
p. 31). Clearly, this is a good case for 
teaching about a multinational firm’s 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
Most of the 164 km were dug by 
hand, sand carried away by mules 
and camels. Only later did the firm 
find enough capital to bring in steam-
powered machines. Sometimes there 
were no workers, materials, or no con-
tractors, or no legal authorizations, or 
no money to go on. Hence, Suez set 
the standard for cost overruns (and 
lying about it) in transport infrastruc-
ture, says megaprojects expert Bent 
Flyvbjerg: “Actual construction costs 
were 20 times higher than the earliest 
estimated costs and three times high-
er than the cost estimate for the year 
before construction began” (2002, p. 
286). It took years before the Canal 
became profitable for the company, 
but finally the firm thrived. 
The host country hardly profited at 
all, which Europeans ignored until 
the sun set on colonialism. They also 
neglected economic development of 
the canal corridor. For 144 years, its 
banks have been empty. Ports and 
canal communities are poor, jobless, 
and hotbeds of violent rebellion. In 
a new megaproject, Egypt plans to 
make the area a world hub for logistics 
and industry (Werr, 2012). 
VII. SHARING THE SKIES 
Civil aviation is the most international 
of international businesses. But airlines 
have never been “just another industry” 
(Rhoades, 2008, p. 3). Relative to their 
size, they get overproportional atten-
tion but usually underperform. They 
tend to be undercapitalized, suffer 
high fixed operating costs, and yield 
ridiculously low profit margins. When 
Europe’s airlines took off in the 1920s, 
the situation was the same. Except that 
flying was still an adventure, and ma-
nagers were still inventing the airline.
European airlines flew on two wings. 
First, they were from the start inter-
national. It made no sense to fly only 
domestic. Countries were too small. 
Even large nations could be traveled 
well by ground transport. Some air-
lines were what IB theory 70 years later 
described as “born global,” a firm 
type which internationalizes instantly 
“by design and not by emergence” 
(Tanev, 2013, p. 5). Second, the sta-
te was ever-present. It regulated the 
industry heavily. It offered lucrative air 
mail contracts which “subsidized the 
passengers and made it worthwhile to 
bother with them” (Hudson & Pettifer, 
1979, p. 51). It paid other subsidies, 
or even became owner. Most airlines 
started on private initiative but came 
fast under state influence. Privileged 
firms became flag carriers of the nation, 
evolving into “government birds” (Sta-
niland, 2003). Britain, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and Por-
tugal financed a national air service 
to connect homeland and colonies. 
It was a matter of national prestige, 
“almost unthinkable” not to have one 
(Dierikx, 2008, p. 13). 
Deutsche Luft Hansa had no such task 
in the 1920s. Germany had lost its 
colonies and was restricted in aviation 
development. Still, DLH received gen-
erous subsidies. A visible airline was 
important politically. Germany was 
forbidden to have an air force, and na-
tional reputation was in need of repair. 
DLH was to promote exports, expand 
commercial relations, and be a symbol 
for Germany’s technical and economic 
leadership (Fritzsche, 1992, p. 178). DLH 
spread its wings over Europe and con-
centrated on linking major cities; by 
the late 1920s, it flew more passengers 
and kilometers than all neighbor air-
lines combined. It became “Europe‘s 
first ‘European’ airline” (Lyth, 2011, 
p. 262). There were global ambitions, 
too. DLH was able to compete hard in 
remote places (Crouch, 2003, p. 212). 
DLH had subsidiaries in Brazil (Con-
dor) and Spain (Iberia). Forerunner 
Junkers had already connected Turkey, 
Persia, and South America, which was 
a hot spot for Germans interests. In a 
highly political deal with the revolu-
tionary Soviet Union, DLH co-owned 
German-Russian airline Deruluft, and 
for China mail, it created the Eurasia 
Aviation Corp.
To fly cross-border, foreign airlines had 
to rely on bilateral state agreements. 
After World War I, air law was strict. 
States insisted on full sovereignty over 
their airspace, unwilling to apply to 
the sky maritime law’s “freedom of the 
seas” principle that oceans are open 
to all trade. Only in 1944 did a UN 
conference in Chicago declare “free-
doms of the air”. With many wrenches 
thrown in the works, “it was almost 
miraculous that the 1920s and 1930s 
saw the development of an extensive 
international network of air services,” 
notes Dierikx; often, political obstac-
les “at the negotiating table were even 
bigger than the actual problems to 
be overcome en route” (2008, p. 15). 
Airlines, fearing dog-eat-fog competi-
tion, tried to iron out matters among 
themselves. In 1919, managers of six 
young airlines (British, Danish, Dutch, 
German, Norwegian, and Swedish) 
founded the International Air Traffic 
Association (IATA) – which is still key in 
today’s global air transport. Its mem-
bers began to standardize ticketing, 
booking, safety and technical rules, 
passenger rights, liability and insu-
rance, and to synchronize schedules. 
Most European airlines became IATA 
members fast. By the 1930s this Euro-
pean idea drew in firms from Africa, 
Asia, and the Americas. It became the 
“parliament of the world‘s airlines.” Its 
relaunch after 1945 led to state-ratified 
price-fixing which, for some, made 
IATA “one of the most hated cartels 
in the world” (Sampson, 1985, p. 10). 
The cartel “suited the Europeans” be-
cause it protected profits of weak air-
lines  (Heppenheimer, 1995, p. 117).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The five compact cases presented here 
are suggestions meant to engage the 
reader in thinking about scenarios for 
class, based on examples from the 
author’s teaching in 2010-12. Detailed 
tips for didactics, methods or media have 
not been given here, nor has student 
feedback been discussed For that, the 
author refers back to section II. Rather, 
the author’s intention was to introduce 
to the motivated non-historian reader 
what kind of themes and topics may 
be used in an IB class. Historic cases 
should be interesting to the student 
who is not per se interested in history. 
If told that “history matters!”, he may 
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not be all that all willing to make an 
extra effort to find out all by himself 
how history matters. This is for the 
professor to prove. To link yesterday’s 
legacy of European business with 
today’s critical questions is, of course, 
key to making this kind of teaching 
relevant.
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